— Naorem Sanajaoba
Insurgency in the north eastern region triggered off with Manipur revolution in 1950. In the conventional Manipuri revolutionary historiography, some of the historians are used to marginalise the role of the Manipur Communist Party (MCP) of which, Hijam Irabot had been the supremo, and the Red Guard Council (RGC) had been the military apparatus with five red guard commanders that struck militarily at the post- annexation Manipur State and the Indian administrative apparatus from 1950 to 1951. The 1950 MCP revolution was undoubtedly aborted for many a reason- the inevitable and the erroneous.
It could have been possible that despite their studying two three books of Mao purchased from Silchar, the RGC leadership was not ideologically mature enough barring the supremo’s personal interface with Marxians in Sylhet jail .
Naturally, the MCP with its party supremo and the striking force– the RGC deserve full credit for launching the post- independence armed struggle- the first ever in Manipur in 1950, possibly a harbinger in the entire region. Pro-revolutionarys shows admiration for the methodology, revolutionary tactics he had taken care of, whereas revisionist capitalise on the event by omitting his revolutionism
International politics of the pre-and post-war period witnessed the communist polycentrism in the CPSU monolith to which the CPI belonged on the one hand, and Yugoslav or, Communist China specific communist configurations. The CPSU within had been a bundle of competing political theses including Zhadnov thesis that prevailed upon others in CPSU’s expansion of communist ideology towards the east- particularly Asia. The CPSU had recommended the then rising Maoist armed struggle for Asia. Strategically, in the over all cold war situation, the communist targeted the end of what N Lenin called imperialism and tactically, Mao Tse Tung’s tested peasant rebellion, particularly after its success in 1949 had been more suitable for non-European eastern question.
The CPI had, therefore, endorsed Calcutta conference resolutions for triggering off armed struggle in India, which included, , India-administered Manipur, Tripura and British Assam as well. Till the CPSU clandestinely mandated CPI through top secret channels to abandon BT Randive line of armed struggle for India in 1951, which the afoji could not receive while in Burma, the RGC did the armed struggle in Manipur valley in 1950-1951.
The CPI like the BCP (both white and red flags) considered Indian independence as sham, and it had to take up armed struggle largely, for the independence of India. At the time when the afoji left for Burma by default in 1951, the Burmese communist insurgency was at logger heads and more complicated, because, in 1946, Trotskyte Thakin Soe split pro- Maoist, Stalinist, all Burman BCP and formed the Red flag while, Thakin Than Tun and Ba Thienof BCP attended 1948 Calcutta conference. In March, 1948, BCP had started the armed uprising by way of implementing the thesis of HN Ghosal who was eliminated by Thakin Tan Tun a decade later , who in turn had also been liquidated , due to ideological reasons.
The Manipuri afoji was small enough to bring to terms the irreconcilable forces, at time when the BCP (white flag) Thakin Than Tun strictly followed the Cominform line- the Zhadnov approach, re-enunciated by Ghoshal. The most misconstrued access of the supremo to Burma had actually been firstly to gain arms aid from Burmese insurgents, secondly, to move easily in liberated zone in Burma, as the party so directed.
The RGC striking force had 32 trained red guards, supported by about 500 village guards and strong network of sympathisers from amongst the peasantry. Some writers had confused the 500 village guards as the graduated red guards. The red guards had struck upon the Manipur police, Manipur rifles and 4th Assam rifles. In 1950, the inaugural armed struggle was considered to be an unprecedented event.
Even today the CPI/CPM of India had to fight out the Communist Party Maoists that sustain armed struggle in 15 more Indian states outside the NE region. The latter unwittingly snubs the anti-revolutionary CPI-CPM as opportunistic, reactionary ,social imperialists comparable to their counterpart - the American imperialism. The debate goes on.
The MCP or, CPI later on, had probably not denounced Indian annexation of sovereign Manipur., unlike the socialist party or young socialist league or one of the two Congress factions in Manipur that strongly challenged the so called disputed merger of the country by a power which they considered foreign. One had to admit that in that age it was a big event which no one could fairly overlook even today.
The party supremo afoji and the MCP had given more emphasis on the Manipur revolution in conformity with the CPSU guidelines, CPI mandate than on the issue of Manipur annexation. The CPSU had been consistent in directly fraternalising national liberation movements in a large number of colonial situations, particularly in the third world. The historic de-colonisation UN, GA resolution no. 1514 of 1960 had been proposed by the USSR and seconded by India. CPSU’s fraternal party- CPI had espoused right of people to self-determination till 1951; CPI member Somnath Lahiri espoused right to secession of constituent states of India in the Constituent Assembly. The CPI actively supported the right to self determination of Pakistan.
The de- annexation agenda is the contribution of the post-MCP gen-next and their organised rebellion or insurgency, which the Government of India is yet to fully address to as on today . Certain issues like Purnadayitaysheel shashan and Swadhin Bharatkee Manungda Swadhin Manipur of a 1946 civil society resolution had created more confusion than necessary.
Barring the Praja Mandal and Nikhil Manipuri Mahashbha meeting resolution, dated 5-4-1946 which, asked for independent Manipur inside independent India, holding plebiscite to decide the possible integration of Manipur with another province, the MCP or its frontal organisation did not ask for sovereign status of Manipur. The political by-products had been transformation of rebels into the CPI in Manipur, and the involvement of some of the ranking MCP activists [ not RGC command] initiating the Meetei state committee armed struggle in 1960s and the grand initiative of L Manimohon and L Kanhai of the MCP in hatching the UNLF, among others.
Political assassinations happened decades after. Subsequently thereafter, the next phase of guerrilla war of the PLA (eastern division) and PREPAK happened in the valley in 1979, supposedly, heavier in tone, ideology and texture than that of the aborted 1950 MCP revolution, to be followed by the MPA guerrilla offensives in the 1990s. The rest is the recent story unfolding frame after frame, before our own eyes.
The red guards revolution in 1950-1951 left a profound, indelible impact on informed Manipuri world view and onward progression of a composite, egalitarian history of the ancient Asian State. The MCP revolution remains a pathfinder in a redefined , better articulated political landscape.
(The writer is former Dean, Law Faculty, GU) source: assam tribune
